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CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AND THE
NECESSITY FOR A POST-SEIZURE
HEARING: ARE CCE AND RICO RACKETS
FOR THE GOVERNMENT?
Motivated by the increasing influence and wealth of organized
crime in the United States, Congress in 1970 enacted legislation to
provide the law enforcement community with the necessary tools
to deal effectively with the problem.' The congressional response
See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOC'Y 196-201 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME]; Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-21 (1980). The
congressional response to the problem of organized crime began in 1950 when the Attorney
General of the United States assembled a national conference to consider the problem of
organized crime. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra, at 196. By the 1960's, the substantial
impact of organized crime was "well-documented." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1784, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1960) (report of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor and Management Field); S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1960); S. REP. No.
307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1951); S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1951). Despite
this extensive documentation, however, law enforcement organizations had not yet united
into a collective effort against racketeering. See Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1015. In 1967,
the President's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice explored the
impact of organized crime on legitimate business and made recommendations to curb its
growth. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra, at 203-09. The Senate responded with the intro-
duction of bills which evolved into a concerted effort by Congress to combat the problem of
organized crime. See Blakey & Gettings, supra, at 1015-21. The culmination of this congres-
sional effort was the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This
comprehensive Act includes 12 separate titles designed to control the problems of organized
crime. The Statement of Findings and Purpose prefacing the Act noted the congressional
concern:
[o]rganized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's econ-
omy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption;...
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlaw-
ful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
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included passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)2 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprises Act
(CCE),3 both of which sought to wrest power from organized crime
by attacking its economic base.4
Enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,1
RICO is a procedural and substantive statute which provides both
criminal and civil sanctions for its violation.' The Continuing
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(9), 84 Stat. 922, 922-23. See also REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE U.S., ASSET FORFEITURE: SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAF-
FICKING 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL].
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). RICO was enacted as title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). RICO attempts to end organ-
ized crime's infiltration into legitimate business through an attack "on all available fronts."
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1969) [hereinafter cited as RICO S. REP.]. Enacted
specifically to counter the acquisition of businesses with money illegally derived from rack-
eteering activity, see id. at 76-79, RICO goes beyond prior attempts to combat organized
crime, through the imposition of several criminal and civil penalties. Id. at 79. The criminal
sanctions seek to curb organized crime through fine, imprisonment and the novel penalty of
in personam forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976); see infra note 9, while the civil measures
provide penalties against organized crime patterned after the antitrust laws, 18 U.S.C. §
1964(a)-(c) (1976). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 [hereinafter
cited as RICO H.R. REP.], reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007; RICO S.
REP., supra, at 76-83.
- 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). CCE was enacted as part of title II of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 26, 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). CCE
affords strict criminal penalties for involvement in "continuing criminal enterprises" in vio-
lation of the Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1), (2) (1976). Enacted to provide a punitive ap-
proach to the problems of drug trafficking, H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
[hereinafter cited as CCE H.R. REP.], reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4566,
4575-76, CCE seeks to destroy the economic bases of organized crime which infiltrate legiti-
mate business, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLE R GENERAL, supra note 1, at 9. See generally S.
REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-82 (1969); CCE H.R. REP., supra, at 10-11 (discussion
of the severe criminal penalties provided by CCE).
4 See REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 9. Senator McClellan, a
sponsor of RICO, stated:
[T]itle IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations.
Experience has shown that it is insufficient to merely remove and imprison indi-
vidual mob members, Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means of
wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their
return and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains.
116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970). See also CCE H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4575-76 (approach of
CCE is to punish individual offenders through forfeiture of profits derived from illegal drug
trafficking).
6 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
6 Section 1962 sets forth the prohibited activities of RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976),
while sections 1963 and 1964 provide for criminal penalties and civil remedies respectively.
See id. §§ 1963-1964. Sections 1965 through 1968 provide the procedure to be used in con-
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Criminal Enterprises Act was enacted as part of the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Control Act of 1970,7 and imposes criminal penal-
ties for participation in a "continuing criminal enterprise."" A vio-
lation of either statute may result in imprisonment, fines and
forfeiture of the "interests" or "profits" derived from the pro-
scribed act.9 Both statutes permit imposition of a restraining order
on the indicted individual's property during the pendency of the
trial; upon conviction, the property is forfeited to the government,
thereby removing it from the working capital of organized crime.
While these provisions appear to serve as effective weapons to
attack the economic foundation of organized crime, 10 several ques-
tions have been raised concerning the procedural aspects of the
forfeiture process. Of particular import is the necessity for an ad-
versarial hearing at which the individual can challenge the imposi-
tion of a restraining order on his property pursuant to a RICO or
CCE indictment.1" Regrettably, however, neither of the statutes
nection with civil RICO actions including venue and service of process, expedition of pro-
cess, evidence, and civil investigative demand. See id. §§ 1965-1968.
7 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21,
26, 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The Drug Control Act was enacted to curtail the
illegal manufacture and distribution of drugs. See CCE H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 3. The
Act contains three titles: Rehabilitation, Control and Enforcement, and Imports and Ex-
ports. See id. (analysis of the provisions of the Drug Control Act).
s 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1), (2) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976); 21 U.S.C. 848(a) (1976). The criminal sanctions for viola-
tion of RICO include maximum penalties of $25,000, 20 years imprisonment and forfeiture
of interests acquired in violation of the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). The penalties for
the first violation of CCE include maximum penalties of $100,000, 10 years imprisonment
and forfeiture of profits derived from the violation as well as the individual's interest in the
enterprise. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1) (1976). For further violations of CCE, a defendant would
face similar forfeiture, receive a minimum term of 20 years and be fined a maximum of
$200,000. Id.
The forfeiture provisions of each statute are unique in that they are the first in per-
sonam forfeiture statutes enacted in America. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14. In
personam forfeiture was considered by some legislators to carry a great potential for abuse,
see RICO H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 187-88 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mivka &
Ryan), and to invoke questions of constitutionality, see infra notes 91-99 and accompanying
text. But see 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff) (attacks on forfeiture
provisions are not well founded); 116 CONG. REC. 592-93 (1979) (remarks of Sen. McClellan)
(forfeiture provisions a response to criminal justice system's inability to curb Mafia
activity).
10 See RICO S. REP., supra note 2, at 79-80. See generally REPORT OF THE COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 4-10.
11 Compare United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (since a re-
straining order halts business activity, a defendant should "be afforded a prompt hearing
once the restraining order has been entered") and United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293,
1298 (9th Cir. 1982) (sanctions under civil and criminal statutes involve questions of due
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delineate the procedural method to the employed in effecting such
a seizure.12 Moreover, the unique position of RICO and CCE forfei-
ture in the American jurisprudential system 13 is reflected by the
lack of analogous case law or statutes from which to glean the
proper procedures. 14 Consequently, several courts have concluded
that a hearing is constitutionally mandated, 5 while others have de-
clined to adopt such a position.'6
process), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-819) with
United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (S.D. Cal. 1979) ("The restraining order
does not make a determination that the defendant is a racketeer") and United States v.
Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975) ("Defendant is no more stripped of the
presumption of innocence by this restraining order than would be the case were he required
to post bond"). The courts that have deemed a hearing necessary have reached that conclu-
sion based upon differing rationales. A hearing has been held necessary on the grounds of
due process, Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617, and on the grounds of statutory construction, Veon,
538 F. Supp. at 243.
12 United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long,
654 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 243-45 (E.D. Cal.
1982); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (D. Md. 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17
Am. CRaM. L. REv. 379, 393-94 (1980).
Seizure, as referred to in this Note, includes the restraint of property. See, e.g., North
Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 85 (1971). The Fuentes Court noted that "[a] temporary nonfinal deprivation of prop-
erty is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the fourteenth amendment." 407 U.S. at
85.
3 See REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 4; Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 143, 157, Rule 7 advisory committee note
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Amendments]; Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 794-95 (1977).
" See Long, 654 F.2d at 916; Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 681. In United States v. Veon,
the court looked initially to in rem forfeiture statutes for guidance, but held that these
statutes were "wholly different" from criminal forfeiture statutes and thus provided no pro-
cedural guidance. 538 F. Supp. at 241-42.
15 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Among the courts that have concluded
that a postseizure hearing is necessary, there is a lack of consensus as to the requisite ele-
ments of such a hearing. E.g., Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 243-49; Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 682-85.
In Veon, the district court held that the burden of proof at the hearing is on the govern-
ment. 538 F. Supp. at 245-46. Further, the court held that the government must prove that
it is likely to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
violating the statute, and that the profits are subject to forfeiture under the Act. Id. at 246.
The Veon court also adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden of
proof. 538 F. Supp. at 248. The Mandel court, however, stated that at the hearing, the
guidelines governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction should be applied to provide
minimal guidance as to entry of a restraining order under RICO. 408 F. Supp. at 682. The
court provided no other directives. See id. at 682-84.
16 See Bello, 470 F. Supp. at 724-25; United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-
16. In Bello, the district court rejected the argument that the restraining order violated the
RICO defendant's due process rights. 470 F. Supp. at 724. The court stated that the re-
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Initially, this Note will examine the history of forfeiture in
English and American jurisprudence. It will analyze the distinction
between in rem and in personam forfeiture, focusing upon the in
personam forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE. The Note will
suggest that a restraining order issued pursuant to a RICO or CCE
indictment must be followed by an adversarial hearing to deter-
mine the validity of the restraining order. Finally, this Note will
propose standards to be employed at such a hearing.
THE HISTORY OF FORFEITURE AS A LEGAL REMEDY
The forfeiture of property as a legal sanction may be traced to
the Old Testament 7 and through the early cultures of Greece,
Rome and England.1 8 English common law expanded the concept
of forfeiture to encompass three distinct types. The first type in-
volved the forfeiture of all real and personal property belonging to
straining order merely freezes the assets, and noted that the grand jury indictment provides
probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated RICO. Id. But see infra notes
123-25 and accompanying text (suggesting that a nexus must be shown between the prop-
erty restrained and the RICO or CCE violation). The court further reasoned that the re-
straint of property was analagous to the posting of a bail bond by a criminal defendant. 470
F. Supp. at 725. But see infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (defendant is accorded
the protection of a preliminary hearing before he can be deprived of his liberty). The dis-
trict court noted further that the restraining order did not deny the defendant his sixth
amendment right to an attorney. 470 F. Supp. at 725. But see infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text (suggesting that the restraining order can under certain circumstances deprive the
defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel).
In Scalzitti, a Pennsylvania district court found premature the defendant's claim that
he had been deprived of due process. 408 F. Supp. at 1015. The court noted that the re-
straining order served only to maintain the status quo. Id. But see supra note 12 (restraint
of property is a deprivation of property).
17 See Exodus 21:28-30. The passage from Exodus reads: "[i]f an ox gore a man or a
woman, and they die, then the ox shall surely be stoned, and his flesh not be eaten; but the
owner of the ox shall be quit." Id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly traced American
forfeiture statutes back to this passage. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 681 & n.17 (1974); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11
(1921); see also United States v. One Tintoretto Painting Entitled "The Holy Family With
Saint Catherine and Honored Donor," 691 F.2d 603, 606 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982); Comment, Su-
preme Court Upholds Forfeiture of Innocent Owner's Property Without Prior Notice and
Hearing, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 468, 468 (1975) (recognizing that forfeiture is traceable to the
Old Testament).
8 See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7-17 (1881); see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *301 (noting acceptance of forfeiture by Greek culture). The theory underlying
the employment of forfeiture was the personification of inanimate objects to make them
capable of fault. O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 7-17; see also Note, supra note 13, at 771 n.1
(referring to the theory of "offending property" as the personification fiction). These ob-
jects, and, at times, animals and slaves, were to be surrendered for the damage that they
caused. O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 8, 10-11.
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an individual convicted of a felony.19 The felon's personal property
was forfeited to the Crown,20 while his real property escheated to
his lord.21
A second type, statutory forfeiture, existed mainly in the areas
of customs, navigation and revenue law.2 2 These statutes, which
typically required in rem forfeiture proceedings, sanctioned forfei-
ture of that part of an individual's personal property used in viola-
tion of the statute.2
The final type of forfeiture under early English law was the
deodand.24 Deodands were items of personalty which were the im-
mediate cause of another's death and as such were subject to for-
feiture.25 Under this type of forfeiture, the chattel itself was not
" See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 63-71 (3d ed. 1923); 1 F. POLLOCK
& V. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 35 (2d ed. 1899) ("[s]elling a man beyond the
seas ... as an alternative to capital punishment"). The rationale underlying forfeiture pur-
suant to a felony conviction is that once an individual has violated principles of society, he
no longer has the rights he had as a member of the community, such as the right to transfer
property. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *299. A felon was also subject to the sanction
of attainder. 4 Id. at *382. Attainder "blackened" the individual, and society refused to
protect or recognize him. Id. at *381. The individual suffered a grievous loss of civil rights,
while the descendants of the tainted individual were prohibited from tracing a line of inheri-
tance up or down through him. Id. at *389; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 356-57 (1736);
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIS ON AmERICAN LAW 504-05 (10th ed. 1860). The harshness that this
statute wrought was subsequently mitigated by prohibiting the imposition of punishment
beyond the life of the convicted felon. See 7 Anne, 21.
20 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *378. Personal property was deemed for-
feited upon conviction. Id. But cf. infra note 21 (real property is forfeited as of the time of
the offense). Criminal forfeiture had an incidental but appealing consequence in that it was
an important source of revenue for the Crown. See Note, supra note 13, at 773.
21 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *378. Forfeiture of realty related back to the
time of the offense and the property could not therefore be effectively transferred prior to
conviction or attainder. Id. at *380. Upon conviction for treason, real property, along with
personal property, was forfeited to the Crown. 1 M. HALE, supra note 19, at 351; 3 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 19, at 68-71; 1 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 351.
22 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *261-62; Note, supra note 13, at 770, 774.
For a discussion of statutory forfeiture in England, see C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S.
133, 137-42 (1943).
2 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *261-62. Actions resulting in statutory forfeiture
were commenced either by the King's Attorney General or by an individual suing qui tam
(on behalf of himself and the State). 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *261-62. Actions
were brought to recover property used in violation of the statute, id., and which was for-
feited upon the judgment, see id.
24 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 24-25; Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some His-
torical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-206 (1973).
25 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 24-25; Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 183; Smith,
Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661,
661 (1978). The owner's lack of knowledge of the crime committed by his agents with the
1983]
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confiscated but its value was assessed and owed to the Crown.26
The underlying rationale of the deodand was that the destruction
of human life threatened the general welfare, and the resultant
harm could be averted only through expiation of the "offending
property. 2 7 Although the deodand was abolished by statute in
1846,28 the Supreme Court has recognized it as the predecessor of
American forfeiture statutes.2"
In America, the belief that forfeiture worked an undue hard-
ship resulted in the constitutional prohibition of corruption of the
blood and forfeiture of estate for treason except during the life of
the person.30 Moreover, the First Congress of the United States en-
acted legislation forbidding corruption of the blood and forfeiture
of the estate upon a felony conviction." Despite these prohibitions,
however, forfeiture pursuant to statutory designation survived.3 2
offending object was no defense to the forfeiture. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 18, at 25. Thus,
"if the master and mariners of a ship furnished with letters of reprisal, committed piracy
against a friend of the king, the owner lost the ship by the admiralty law, although the
crime was committed without his knowledge or assent." Id.
26 Finkeistein, supra note 24, at 185. The money assessed under the deodand sanction
was then offered to the church as a gift to God (deodand is from the latin, deo dandum,
which means to be given to God) for the good of the victim's soul. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 18, at *300; Smith, supra note 25, at 661.
2" See Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 249. Another purpose of the deodand was to sup-
port the decedent's dependents. Smith, supra note 25, at 661.
"8 An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62.
29 See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921). In discussing
forfeiture under a federal tax fraud statute, the Court noted that "[t]here is some analogy to
the law of deodand, by which a personal chattel that was the immediate cause of death of
any reasonable creature was forfeited." Id. at 510. Quoting Blackstone, the Court noted that
"[a] like punishment is in like cases inflicted by the Mosaical law ... " Id. at 511. See also
United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville Two-Door, 250 F. Supp. 183, 185 (W.D.
Mo. 1966); United States v. One 1960 Mercury Station Wagon, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1, 240 A.2d
99, 102 (1968).
'o U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. Section 3, clause 2 provides:
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during
the Life of the Person attainted.
Id.; see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974) (deo-
dands and forfeiture of estate not part of American jurisprudence).
3' See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (presently codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3563 (1970)).
32 See C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943); Smith, supra note 25, at
661-62; Note, supra note 13, at 779-80. While deodands and forfeitures consequent to at-
tainder have not been adopted in America, statutory forfeitures have nevertheless thrived.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974). For instance, in
rem forfeiture was utilized in America before the adoption of the Constitution, id. at 683
(quoting C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)), and its use has not abated,
416 U.S. at 683.
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The early forfeiture statutes, as well as most of their modern
counterparts, provide for civil in rem proceedings against the "of-
fending property. '3 3 These statutes have been consistently upheld
on the theory that the proceeding against the property stands in-
dependent of any action against the individual.34 The enactment of
RICO and CCE, however, represents an unprecedented acceptance
of in personam forfeiture of property for criminal violations.3 5 Un-
like civil in rem proceedings, criminal in personam forfeiture stat-
utes proceed against the offending individual and impose forfeiture
33 See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1085 (1980); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D. Md. 1976), vacated, 591
F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980); Taylor, supra note 12, at 379-80; Note, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of
Innocent Third Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 345, 349 (1982). Statutes which provide for in
rem proceedings include the following: 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976) (transportation of obscene
matters for sale or distribution); 18 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976) (bribe moneys); 19 U.S.C. § 1497
(1976) (failure to declare at entry); 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1976) (libel of vessels and vehicles); 19
U.S.C. § 1595(a) (1976) (seizure for unlawful importation); 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1976)
(adulterated food); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (controlled substances); 26 U.S.C.
§ 5615 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (distilling apparatus); 26 U.S.C. § 5661 (1976) (illegal wine);
26 U.S.C. § 5872 (1976) (illegal firearms); 26 U.S.C. § 5671 (1976) (illegal beer); 26 U.S.C. §§
7301-7303 (1976) (property subject to internal revenue laws); 46 U.S.C. § 325 (1976) (vessels
regulations); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) (narcotics).
34 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974); Vari-
ous Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1931); Dobbins Distil-
lery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210, 237 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827). The basic ration-
ale of this line of cases was articulated by Justice Story in The Palmyra:
The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is
attached primarily to the thing .... Many cases exist, where there is both a
forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty. But in neither class of cases has it ever
been decided that the prosecutions were dependent on each other. But the prac-
tice has been, and so this Court understands the law to be, that the proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam .... In the judgment of this Court, no personal conviction of the of-
fender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15.
-5 See RICO S. REP., supra note 2, at 79-80. The Department of Justice has
commented:
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal per -ty which is embodied in this provision
differs from other presently existing forfeiture provisions under Federal statutes
where the proceeding is in rem against the property and the thing which is de-
clared unlawful under the statute, or which is used for an unlawful purpose, or in
connection with the prohibited property or transaction, is considered the offender,
and the forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense ....
Id. at 79. CCE contains the same in personam feature. See United States v. Spilotro, 680
F.2d 612, 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 246 (E.D. Cal. 1982); REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, supra note 1, at 5.
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as an additional criminal sanction.3 6 While the forfeiture provisions
of RICO and CCE have been challenged as unconstitutionally
vague, 37 as cruel and unusual punishment,8 as violative of the pro-
hibition against double jeopardy,3 as constituting a bill of attain-
der,40 and as violative of the due process protections of the 5th and
14th amendments,4' both statutes have consistently withstood the
attacks.
THE FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF RICO AND CCE
Designed to counteract the expanding influence of organized
crime, RICO and CCE seek to achieve their goals through similar
means. RICO prohibits the investment of income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity in "any enterprise which is engaged
in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce." 42 Also prohibited is the acquisition or maintenance of such
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering.43 The statute pro-
38 In addition to forfeiture, both statutes provide for fines and imprisonment upon a
finding of guilt. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1)(2) (1976). Upon con-
viction, "interests" under RICO and CCE and "profits" under CCE are subject to forfeiture.
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1)-(2) (1976). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been
amended specifically to include procedures to implement in personam forfeiture. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2), 54(b)(5).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1085 (1980); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
38 See, e.g., Huber, 603 F.2d at 396-97; United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141
(N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 285-88 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Boyland, 620 F.2d 359, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1981);
United States v. Brooklier, 637 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980
(1981).
40 See, e.g., Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 141.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914-15 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975). But see United States v. Spilotro, 680
F.2d 612, 616-19 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir.
1982) (RICO and CCE violate of due process by not providing a hearing after entry of a
restraining order pursuant to an indictment), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S.
Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-819).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
43 Id. § 1962(b)-(c). Under RICO
it shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. . . .it shall be unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
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vides for forfeiture of any interest maintained in such an enter-
prise.44 Upon a conviction pursuant to RICO, the government may
acquire the felon's interest in a legitimate or illegitimate enter-
prise, provided the interest was acquired through illegitimate
means or with funds acquired through such means.45 Clearly, these
provisions can have a substantial impact upon the economic base
of organized crime. Moreover, CCE provides for the forfeiture of
the profits derived by the individual from a continuing criminal
enterprise,46 in addition to any interest in such an enterprise. 7
This Act, therefore, seeks to divest the wrongdoer of the fruits of
his crime as a means of curtailing the influence of organized
crime.48
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
I 4 Id. § 1963(a)(1)-(2). The Act states:
Whoever violates [RICO] shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any
interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of [RICO], and (2) any interest
in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording
a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted or participated in the conduct of, in violation of [RICO].
Id. What property is subject to forfeiture under RICO is in dispute. Some courts and com-
mentators hold that "interests" under RICO include profits as well as proprietary interests.
See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1982); Blakey & Gettings,
Evening Up the Odds, TRIAL, Oct. 1980, at 59; Twiss, Impact of RICO Upon Labor Unions,
14 AKRON L. REv. 49, 62-67 (1980); Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: Criminal Forfeiture in
Perspective, 1 Nw. ILL. U.L. REV. 225, 241-47 (1981); Note, RICO: Are the Courts Constru-
ing the Legislative History Rather Than the Statute?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW 777, 783-89
(1980). Other courts and authors contend that "interests" subject to forfeiture under RICO
include only proprietary interests. See, e.g., United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 87 (9th
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1982) (No. 82-538); United
States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Thevis,
474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1980); United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Bradley, Racke-
teers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REv. 837, 888-92 (1980);
Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 290-
91 (1980); Note, supra note 33, at 350-51, 353 nn.95 & 96.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
" 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2),(b) (1976). The CCE provides:
Any person who is convicted ... of engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise shall forfeit to the United States-
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights of
any kind affording a source of influence over such enterprise.
Id.
4 Id. § 848(b); see supra note 46.
" See REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 1, at 915.
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Both statutes authorize the district court to implement forfei-
ture by entering restraining orders, accepting performance bonds,
or taking whatever action it believes necessary to achieve the for-
feiture.49 Accordingly, the district court is granted broad latitude
in the preconviction stage in dealing with property subject to for-
feiture under either RICO or CCE.50 A typical action proceeds
upon the issuance of a grand jury indictment alleging the defen-
dant's violation of the particular statute and specifying the prop-
erty subject to forfeiture under the statute.5 1 Upon return of the
indictment, the government moves for a restraining order to be
placed upon this property.5 2 Such a motion is made upon an ex
parte demonstration of evidence or merely by governmental re-
quest.5 3 When the restraining order is entered, it remains in effect
until final resolution of the conflict and prevents the defendant
from selling, transferring, encumbering or disposing of the prop-
erty.5 4 If the defendant is ultimately found guilty, the jury returns
' 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (1976).
50 See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980). The broad latitude of the statute, however, creates a potential for prosecutorial
abuse. See United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1055 (1981); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980).
81 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). Forfeiture may only ensue in a criminal proceeding
when the indictment alleges the extent of the property subject to forfeiture. Id. The indict-
ment will thus serve to give the defendant notice of the government's intent to seek forfei-
ture of specified property. See id.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The indictment gives the defendant notice of
what property is subject to forfeiture. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the defen-
dant may attempt to transfer his property. See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d
Cir. 1981). The restraining order thus serves to prevent a preconviction transfer of assets.
RICO H.R. REP. supra note 2, at 57; see also United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616
(9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the ability of the district court to enter restraining orders). The
restraining order cannot issue until the indictment is returned. Weiner, supra note 44, at
250.
" See, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-819) United States v. Long, 654 F.2d
911, 913 (3d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982)
(restraining order issued pursuant to government request); United States v. Veon, 538 F.
Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (restraining orders issued on ex parte showing by the
government).
" See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant re-
strained from "disposing of any title to, assets of or interest in [his business] during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings"); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25
(S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order entered preventing defendant from "selling, transferring,
or otherwise disposing of or encumbering" his residence or business assets); see United
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a special verdict, which lists the property subject to forfeiture55
and authorizes the attorney general to seize it.56
The entire process, particularly the entry of a restraining or-
der prior to conviction, subjects the individual to substantial hard-
ship. For instance, in United States v. Crozier,57 the district court
granted a restraining order on "virtually all [the defendant's] real
and personal property" pursuant to a CCE indictment. 5 Similarly,
in United States v. Thevis,59 a restraining order was entered to
restrict the payments made out of the defendant's business.60 As a
result, the defendant was unable to make alimony and support
payments and was threatened with a lawsuit.61 Particularly troub-
lesome is the fact that after the trial in Thevis, the government
chose not to pursue the forfeiture of much of the property covered
by the restraining order.62
While RICO and CCE both authorize entry of a restraining
order to prevent a preconviction transfer of assets, neither statute
indicates the procedural methods to be employed in securing such
an order.6 3 The statutes do not afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to challenge the entry of the restraining order prior to trial.
Further, neither statute provides a procedure to expedite the trial,
States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (restraining order merely pre-
serves the status quo). But see United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md.
1976) (restraining order denied because it would constitute pretrial determination of guilt),
aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), aff'd en banc, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
"5 FED. RULE CRIM. P. 31(e). Rule 31(e) provides that a special verdict will be returned
to the extent of the property subject to forfeiture whenever an indictment subjects a defen-
dant to forfeiture. Id.; see 1972 Amendments, supra note 13, at 159-60; Rule 31(e) advisory
committee note. For the jury to conclude that property is subject to forfeiture, they must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the property to be forfeited is related to the RICO or
CCE violation. See Weiner, supra note 44, at 252.
" FED. R. Cins. P. 32(b)(2); see also 1972 Amendments, supra note 13, at 160. Rule
32(b)(2) advisory committee note (specifically applying Rule 32(b)(2) to RICO and CCE).
57 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Nov. 15,
1982) (No. 82-819).
8 Id. at 1295-96. Part of the property restrained was not Crozier's, but that of a code-
fendant. Id. at 1295. The codefendant occupied the same house, but her property was not
subject to forfeiture under the indictment. Id. Additionally, property jointly owned by the
two was restrained. Id.
59 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980).
"' See id. at 145.
61 Taylor, supra note 12, at 394.
12 Id. The special verdict returned by the jury in Thevis further limited some of the
property sought. Id.
" See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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nor penalties for delay.64 Thus, the only option left to a defendant
deprived of virtually all his property is to await the outcome of the
trial.6 5
In the absence of specific statutory guidance, several courts
have upheld RICO against procedural due process challenges."' In
United States v. Bello,67 the Southern District of California held
that a grand jury indictment provided sufficient probable cause to
subject the property to restraint pending the outcome of the trial."8
The court rejected the defendant's claim that the restraining order
constituted a violation of due process, 9 analogizing the entry of a
restraining order to the posting of a bail bond by a defendant to
ensure his appearance at trial.70 In United States v. Scalzitti,7 1 a
Pennsylvania district court held that the restraining order issued
pursuant to an indictment did not deprive the defendant of any
property interest,7 2 but merely served to protect the status quo.7 3
Scalzitti did not address the question of a hearing either before or
64 See Tarlow, supra note 44, at 295 & n.732; cf. Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1297 (restraint
pending outcome of criminal trial may result in unjust deprivation with no remedy for the
loss).
65 See Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1296.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25 (S.D. Cal. 1979); United
States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
67 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
68 Id. at 724. The Bello court held that the grand jury indictment provided probable
cause to believe that the defendant was guilty of a RICO violation and that the property
was subject to forfeiture under the Act. Id. But see United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp.
679, 683 (D. Md. 1976) (a "mere indictment ... [containing] only conclusory allegations"
held to be an insufficient ground upon which to restrain property), aff'd in part and vacated
and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afl'd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
69 470 F. Supp. at 724-25. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the re-
straining order constitutes a pretrial determination of guilt. Id. The district court in Mandel
noted that in order for the government to obtain a restraining order on the defendant's
property, it would be necessary for the prosecution to prove that they are likely to prevail at
the trial. 408 F. Supp. at 682. The court held, however, that such a finding would be incon-
sistent with the presumption of defendant's innocence. Id. at 683.
71 470 F. Supp. at 724-25.
71 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
712 Id. at 1015. The court held that the defendant's claim of deprivation was premature
since a restraining order serves only to preserve the existing situation. Id. But see supra
note 12 & infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (restraint of property is the equivalent
of seizure).
73 408 F. Supp. at 1015. The Scalzitti court analogized the restraining order to a bail
bond that a defendant is required to post. Id.; cf. United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723,
725 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order does not deprive defendant of due process but merely
freezes assets pending trial). But see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (property
seizure is a violation of defendant's due process rights).
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after entry of a restraining order. It is suggested, however, that ex
parte restraint of a defendant's property without affording him an
opportunity to challenge the order prior to trial raises serious
questions as to the sufficiency of procedural safeguards. Appar-
ently recognizing these problems, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Croziere4 and United States v. Spilotro, 7 5 concluded that
due process mandates a post-seizure hearing.76 It is submitted that
the mandatory hearing advocated by the Ninth Circuit is essential
to preserving the constitutionality of RICO and CCE.
CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR AN ADVERSARIAL HEARING
Primary among the reasons for advocating an adversarial hear-
ing are the demands of due process. Due process"7 protections ema-
nate from the fifth 8 and fourteenth79 amendments and impose re-
straints upon the government's ability to deprive an individual of
his liberty or property. 0 Procedural due process requires that an
individual whose liberty and property are to be affected by govern-
ment action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
" 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Nov. 15,
1982) (No. 82-819).
75 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
76 680 F.2d at 616-18; 674 F.2d at 1297.
77 Due process guarantees have their origin in the Magna Carta, which was intended to
"secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown and place him under the pro-
tection of the law." Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889). Today, due process
requirements similarly protect the individual from arbitrary government action. See Kelley
v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976). Due process is a flexible concept, Cafeteria & Restau-
rant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), which works to protect individu-
als within the context of a particular situation, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848 (1977) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)). Due process protection includes both a substantive and procedural aspect. Kel-
ley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. at 244. Substantive due process reaches "those situations where the
deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in
the future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals,
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961).
Procedural due process relates to the process necessary when government action subjects an
individual to possible deprivation of life, liberty or property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." Id.
79 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
Id.
so Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81
(1972).
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"meaningful" time and manner.8' Compliance with these require-
ments necessarily involves a two-step inquiry. First, the court must
determine whether the individual has a property interest which en-
titles him to due process protection. 2 Second, if the individual's
property interest is sufficient, the court must decide what level of
process is due.83
In assessing whether an individual has a property interest
which triggers due process safeguards, the interests protected by
the Constitution serve as guidelines. The fourteenth amendment's
protection encompasses "[tlhe security of interests that a person
has already acquired in specific benefits, ' 84 including all the inter-
ests to which an individual is entitled.s5 Accordingly, property in-
terests protected by the fourteenth amendment include vehicles, 6
consumer goods,87 utility services,8 wages 9 and bank accounts."0
"' Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39-40 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). The opportunity to be heard neces-
sarily implies that the individual is entitled to notice. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. at 394;
Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). The underlying rationale for requiring an
opportunity to be heard, in cases involving seizure of property, is to protect the individual's
right to use and possess the property and to minimize the possibility of an erroneous depri-
vation. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). Due process protection "reflects the high
value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we place on a person's right
to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference." Id. (citation omitted).
82 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972).
83 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63
(1970).
8 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). An individual "must have more
than an abstract need" for the property, as well as a "legitimate claim" to it, in order to
have a protected property interest. Id. at 577.
815 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86-90 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379-80 (1971). The protection of "property" has been interpreted expansively to in-
clude protection of "'any significant property interest'." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86 (quoting
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379). Property interests are not limited to ownership interests but ex-
tend to include statutory entitlements, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), and inter-
ests in goods purchased under a conditional sales contract, Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86. The
protection of the fourteenth amendment is not limited to goods which are necessities. Id. at
90.
88 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678 (1974)
(rented boat deemed sufficient property interest and seizure necessitates a hearing).
"7 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972) (goods purchased on conditional
sales contract, where full title had not yet vested in the buyer, constitutes sufficient prop-
erty interest to invoke due process protection).
" See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (termi-
nation of utility services without notice or an opportunity to present the complaint violates
due process).
89 See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969) (garnishment of
wages constitutes taking of property and mandates due process protection).
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Under RICO and CCE, property subject to forfeiture and thus to
entry of a restraining order includes the defendant's interest in an
enterprise, as well as the profits on income the defendant derives
from such enterprise.9' Therefore, it is submitted that property
subject to restraint under RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions is
within the purview of the property interests protected under the
due process clause.9 2
Step two of the due process inquiry mandates determination
of the process due in light of the interest at stake. The property
interest involved in proceedings under RICO and CCE is the indi-
vidual's right to possess property freely and to dispose of it as he
chooses.9 3 This property interest must be accorded great weight in
view of the potential length of the deprivation as well as the poten-
tially large investment subject to forfeiture. The duration of an er-
roneous deprivation is a significant factor to be considered in as-
sessing the process due.94 As neither RICO nor CCE provides for
expedition of the trial, the action will proceed along the course of
90 See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (gar-
nishment of bank account requires due process protection).
1 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Under these two statutes, restraining
orders have been entered upon houses, see, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293,
1296 (9th Cir.) (restraining order placed on defendant's home pursuant to CCE indictment),
petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-819); United States v.
Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order entered on defendant's
home, which government contended was purchased with money derived from racketeering),
businesses, see, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1982) (restraining
order entered on business pursuant to indictment under RICO charging racketeering activ-
ity in connection with the conduct of the business); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp.
1014, 1014-15 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (restraining order entered on defendant's business pursuant
to a RICO indictment), jewelry, see, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1296, and
vehicles, see, e.g., United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 912 (3d Cir. 1981) (pursuant to CCE
indictment, restraining order entered upon the defendant's airplane).
92 It may be argued that property sought to be forfeited under RICO and CCE is not
within the protection of due process because it is property which an individual has illegally
obtained, and thus he has no legal entitlement to it. This argument must be discounted,
however, because the criminal defendant is accorded a presumption of innocence. See infra
text accompanying note 118. Further, there is no established nexus between the property
alleged to be forfeited in a RICO or CCE indictment and the crime allegedly committed. See
infra text accompanying notes 122-23. Absent sufficient proof of violation of a crime, the
defendant's connection to the crime, and a nexus between the property and the crime alleg-
edly committed, there is no justification for restraint of the property. Cf. infra notes 126-31
and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
94 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.
379, 389 (1975)). The potential length of deprivation is a factor to weigh but it is not deci-
sive in determining the process due. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601, 606 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
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other criminal actions. Thus, the potential risk of a lengthy depri-
vation is high, as the restraining order will remain on the property
pending resolution of the conflict. Moreover, the weight of the
property interests is strengthened by the likelihood that substan-
tial investments will be at stake, given that both RICO and CCE
grant the government broad authority to employ the forfeiture and
attack the economic base.15 Arguably therefore, the property inter-
ests involved require the due process protections of a hearing."
91 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (deprivation of welfare benefits that
provid,- defendant with the necessities of life strengthens the need for due process protec-
tion); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1969) (deprivation of wages due
to garnishment weighs heavily in favor of due process protections, because such deprivation
is a restriction on "the means for daily subsistence"). It is suggested that the restraint of
most or all of a defendant's assets may similarly serve to deprive a defendant, see supra
notes 58-62 and accompanying text, and thus a stricter construction of his due process
rights is required.
'" In addition to the due process argument, two other arguments may be advanced in
favor of provision for a hearing pursuant to the entry of a restraining order. Entry of a
restraining order on a defendant's property in the absence of a probable cause finding may
result in a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Veon, 538
F. Supp. 237, 247 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.
Cal. 1982). In order to guarantee a defendant's right to a fair trial, he is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,489 (1978); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). The right to counsel has been interpreted to include more than
just the right to be represented by an attorney. It has been interpreted to mean the "right
to a meaningful attorney-client relationship." Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2005 (1982); see United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 188
(D.C. Cir. 1982). This right includes such factors as trust, confidence, candor, communica-
tion, Slappy, 649 F.2d at 720 (quoting McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22 (Alaska 1974)),
and complete fidelity between the attorney and his client, Green, 680 F.2d at 192 (Bazelon,
J., dissenting). Therefore, it is argued that the sixth amendment right to counsel includes
the right to hire counsel of choice. Restraint of a defendant's assets can freeze available
financial resources and render him unable to hire counsel. See United States v. Bello, 470 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979). While court-appointed counsel is available to a defendant,
it is submitted that precluding an individual from entering into the attorney-client relation-
ship of his choice violates his sixth amendment right to counsel.
Further, the issue of the necessity for a hearing pursuant to in personam seizure may be
resolved by looking solely to principles of statutory construction. See United States v. Veon,
538 F. Supp. 237, 243-45 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The principle of lenity states that a court "will
not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty it places on an individ-
ual, when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended." Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958); see Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 695 n.10 (1980); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971). Lenity is
applicable when an ambiguity exists in a statute, Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387
(1980), and extends to the ambit of the statute and its penalties, Albernaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981). As ambiguity exists in both the RICO and CCE statutes in relation
to the necessity for a hearing, it is submitted that strict construction of those statutes in
favor of a criminal defendant requires that the statutes be construed so as to provide for a
hearing. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 243; see Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 407 (1980).
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The term "hearing," however, contemplates a wide range of pro-
ceedings. It is therefore necessary to set out the appropriate com-
ponents of the proposed postseizure hearing.
HEARING REQUIREMENTS
Procedural due process is a flexible concept which does not
mandate any standard form of hearing.97 Rather, it requires an
analysis of the particular fact situation to determine the appropri-
ate form of proceeding.98 Establishing the requisite formalities of
the hearing requires a balancing of such factors as the nature of
the proceeding, the value of the property interest to the individual
involved, whether the government's action deprives an individual
of property he possesses or simply denies him a potential benefit,
and the government interest at stake.9 The balancing of these fac-
tors in the context of RICO and CCE restraining orders results in
the following proposed set of hearing requirements.
(where the text of a statute fails to address an issue, an ambiguity exists and the rule of
lenity applies).
97 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrisey v. Brewer, 498 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Cafeteria Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see
also K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 13.0, at 237 (Supp. 1982) (problem is not
whether to have a hearing but what form of hearing should be afforded); Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (commenting on the various connota-
tions of the term "hearing").
11 Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings In Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REv. 585, 592 (1972); see K. DAvis, supra note 97, § 13.0, at 236. One commentator
has noted that a determination of the adequacy of administrative proceedings turns on "the
extent to which the procedure furthers the accurate selection and determination of relevant
facts and issues, the efficient disposition of business, and, when viewed in the light of the
statutory objections, its acceptability to the agency, the participants, and the general pub-
lic." Cramton, supra at 592. Professor Davis suggests that the traditional two-part due pro-
cess test, see supra text accompanying notes 82-83, is in fact a three-tiered inquiry: 1) is the
interest a protected one?; 2) if it is, does due process mandate a hearing?; 3) if it does, then
what kind of hearing is required? K. DAvs, supra note 97, § 13.0, at 256; see, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (an analysis of the private interest, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation, and the government interest involved, requires something less than
an evidentiary hearing prior to deprivation of social security benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971) (examination of the purpose of the hearing in light of subsequent
procedures as well as the government interest and the expense requires a hearing before
suspension of a driver's license); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1974) (analysis of
the need to protect public funds, the individual's need to be protected from a deprivation of
financial assistance, and the expense of a hearing requires an evidentiary hearing before
termination of welfare benefits).
9 K. DAvis, supra note 97, § 13.12, at 509-12; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW § 93,
at 258-59 (1976); Friendly, supra note 97, at 1295-1304; see Mashaw, Administrative Due
Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1423-24 (1981); infra notes 144-45.
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Preseizure v. Postseizure Hearing
Initially, it is necessary to determine the time at which a hear-
ing should be granted. Due process requires that an individual be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard before his rights are
affected. 100 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that cer-
tain "extraordinary circumstances" exist in which a compelling
governmental reason justifies postponement of the hearing until af-
ter the deprivation. 101 Courts have permitted postseizure hearings
where property was seized in aid of the war effort,10 2 to protect
against a potential bank failure, 10 3 to protect the general public
from misbranded drugs,10 4 and where seizure was pursuant to in
rem forfeiture. 10 5 Each of these situations presents the same com-
pelling factors justifying postponement of the hearing: (1) the
seizure is necessary to protect an important government or public
interest, (2) there is a need for quick action, and (3) the state
strictly controls the force exerted. 0 Consideration of the RICO
and CCE forfeiture situations indicates the presence of the same
three factors, thereby warranting a postponement of the hearing
100 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); supra note 81 and accompanying text. Justice Frankfurter noted that
"the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even
though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle
basic to our society." 341 U.S. at 168. Notice protects the individual against an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to use and possess property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81
(1972). Further, the most effective means of arriving at the truth is to give the individual
notice and an opportunity to prepare his case. Id. However, for notice and hearings to serve
their purpose, they "must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented."
Id. at 81. Future hearings and damage awards cannot correct the harm caused by an arbi-
trary deprivation effected in the absence of the necessary procedural due process. Id. at 82;
see generally Simet, The Right To A Pre-Deprivation Hearing Under the Due Process
Clause-Constitutional Priorities and a Suggested Method for Making Decisions, 11
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1201, 1212 (1978) (property owners have a right to procedural protection
prior to a deprivation).
101 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848
(1977); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1974). Absent the
justification of an "extraordinary circumstance," an individual is entitled to a hearing prior
to the deprivation of a property interest. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 848;
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.7 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 548 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 256
U.S. 239, 245-46 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921).
103 See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947).
10 See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601-02 (1950).
100 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678-80 (1974).
10 Id. at 678 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)).
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until after the seizure. First, the government has a compelling in-
terest in preventing the illegal use of property and in enforcing the
criminal law.107 Similarly, the government must act quickly to pre-
vent a preconviction transfer of property which would frustrate the
goals of the statute.10 8 Finally, the restraint of property is con-
ducted entirely by government officials and is strictly within their
control. 1 Therefore, it is submitted that while RICO and CCE
seizures mandate a hearing as a matter of due process, the hearing
may justifiably be postponed until after the entry of the re-
straining order.
Hearing Format
In establishing the proper procedures to be utilized at the
postseizure hearing, it is important to emphasize that forfeiture
pursuant to RICO and CCE is essentially criminal in nature.110 A
criminal defendant must be provided with more stringent procedu-
ral safeguards in light of the relative strength of the state against
him, the possible sanctions facing him, and the stigma attached to
criminal proceedings."'
Accordingly, it is suggested that the postseizure RICO and
CCE hearing adopted by the federal courts be patterned after the
postarrest hearing currently employed to determine if there is
probable cause to justify holding criminal suspects for further judi-
cial action.112 The preliminary examination provided for under the
107 Cf. id. at 679 (under in rem forfeiture statute, government found to have a compel-
ling interest in preventing illegal use of property and enforcing criminal sanctions).
211 Cf. id. (strong government interest in preventing transfer prior to conviction).
109 Cf. id. (neutral government officials control in rem seizure as opposed to "subinter-
ested private parties"); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950)
(seizures and suits are dependent on the discretion of the attorney general); Fahey v.
Malonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250-54 (1947); (Federal Home Loan Bank Board prescribes rules and
regulations for appointments for conservators); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595
(1931) (government has right to collect tax by summary administrative proceedings); North
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-16 (1908) (health officials deter-
mine if food is unfit).
110 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
I See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
343-44 (1943). The Winship Court noted that "[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized
by the conviction." 397 U.S. at 363.
112 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). See generally D. JoNEs, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: AN ANALYsis AND CRITIQUE 274-80 (1981); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 5:7, at 226-28 (1966); 1 C. WRmirT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
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federal rules is an adversarial hearing, held promptly after arrest,
which affords the accused the right to counsel, the right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses,
and the right to present evidence in his own behalf."3 The hearing
is typically conducted before a neutral and detached magistrate
who makes a final determination of the issues." 4 This type of
hearing, held to be sufficient protection against improper restraint
of the liberty of a criminal defendant, 15 is arguably sufficient to
safeguard against improper restraint of an individual's property.
Applying these procedures to the postseizure hearing under
RICO and CCE would provide the individual an adequate opportu-
nity to challenge the imposition of a restraining order. Addition-
ally, the procedural safeguards encompassed in such a hearing
would serve to reduce, if not to prevent, potential errors inherent
in determining which items of property may ultimately be subject
to forfeiture." 6 Finally, this form of postseizure hearing would
§§ 85-86, at 171-87 (1982). The preliminary examination is a constitutionally mandated
hearing, the purpose of which is to determine whether or not probable cause exists to re-
strain an individual's liberty pending trial. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see 1
C. WRIGHT, supra, § 86, at 185. But see United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 249 n.18
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (distinguishing the preliminary examination to detain a criminal defendant
from a RICO hearing to restrain property).
's 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, § 85, at 180-85. The defendant has a right to counsel
under federal rule 44(a), FED. RULE CRIM. P. 44(a). Further safeguards are provided under
federal rule 5.1(a), which states in part:
If from the evidence it appears that there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the federal
magistrate shall forthwith hold him to answer in district court. The finding of
probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or part. The defen-
dant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his
own behalf.
Id. 5.1(a). But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) ("full panaply of adversarial
safeguards" need not be provided). The federal rules, however, go beyond the constitutional
minimum required by the majority in Gerstein. See .1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, § 85, at
180-85.
14 See FED. R. CraM. P. 5.1(a); 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, § 86, at 185-87; see also
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (in preliminary hearings "the detached judgment
of a neutral magistrate is essential"); Friendly, supra note 97, at 1279 ("an unbiased tribu-
nal is a necessary element in every case where a hearing is required").
' See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
114 (1975); D. JoNEs, supra note 112, at 277-78.
"I A determination of sufficient cause justifying restraint of property will often involve
complex factual issues. See Weiner, supra note 44, at 248 & n.88; see also Magarity, RICO
Investigations: A Case Study, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 367, 369 & n.16 (1980). Forfeiture pur-
suant to RICO and CCE may concern difficult financial questions, Weiner, supra note 44, at
248 n.88, tracing problems, id. at 255-56, and questions of ownership, see United States v.
Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248
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serve to avoid the administrative burden of a "full-blown" trial on
the merits prior to adjudication of the pending criminal charges. 117
Having advanced a postseizure hearing modeled after the pre-
liminary hearing afforded criminal defendants as that most appro-
priate in RICO and CCE prosecutions, attention is now focused
upon the procedural aspects of the hearing.
Evidentiary Issues
Both RICO and CCE are criminal statutes which provide for
criminal sanctions, including forfeiture. Therefore, an individual
indicted under either statute is presumed innocent until proven
guilty." 8 As in any criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden
of proving guilt." 9 Because the forfeiture sanction is inextricably
tied to the guilt of the individual, it is submitted that the govern-
ment must necessarily bear the burden of proof at a hearing chal-
lenging the seizure of property pursuant to the criminal indict-
ment. Additionally, since the proposed postseizure hearing is a
criminal proceeding, 20 both the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure and the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply.12
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (in personam forfeiture provisions and complexity provide great potential
for error). Where resolution of issues turns upon questions of complexity and fact and credi-
bility, giving the defendant an opportunity to participate in the hearing, to present his case,
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him is an important consideration. See
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 99, at 248. Therefore, it is submitted that affording the RICO and
CCE defendant these safeguards at the hearing will increase the effectiveness of the deci-
sion-making process and decrease the risk of error.
117 Since the indicted individual will be accorded a full opportunity to adjudicate his
claim at trial, it is submitted that lack of a full hearing in the preliminary stage is justified.
Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1975) (formalities of the adversary hearing are
"designed for trial" and need not be employed in pretrial hearing).
118 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 700-01 (1975).
119 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969) (government cannot adjudge a juvenile
guilty without convincing a fact finder); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 512, 525-26 (1958)
("Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has
borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt");
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895); T. GARDNER, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 121-22
(1978); K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYsTEM 294 (1982); 1
C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, § 403, at 412-13. The presumption of innocence afforded all
defendants in criminal trials allocates the burden of proof. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533
(1979).
120 See infra text accompanying note 121.
121 FED. R. CIuM. P. 1; FED. R. EvID. 1101(b). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were amended to encompass the in personam forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE. See
1972 Amendments, supra note 13, at 156-57, 159-60, 179-80, Rules 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2),
54(b)(5) advisory committee notes. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to all "criminal
cases and proceedings." FED. R. EVID. 1101(b).
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Elements to be Proven
Both statutes authorize the district court to take whatever ac-
tion it deems necessary in connection with the property to be for-
feited.'22 This broad discretion could lend itself to abuse by the
government, by permitting restraint of virtually all of an individ-
ual's property without establishing its connection to the RICO or
CCE violation. 123 By requiring the government to show that the
property it seeks to have restrained is property subject to forfei-
ture, it is possible to prevent such abuse. It is submitted that the
government will satisfy its burden by proof of two elements. First,
the government must show that probable cause exists to believe
that the defendant is guilty of violating either RICO or CCE.124 An
additional nexus requirement will mandate that the government
establish that each item of property sought to be restrained is con-
nected to a violation of the statute and is therefore subject to
forfeiture.125
Standard of Proof
The postseizure hearing will provide the forum for the presen-
.22 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (1976).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (failure of
CCE to specify the requirements for entry of restraining order could result in an unjust
deprivation with no remedy for the loss), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S.
Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-819); see United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982)
(because of the adverse impact on defendant's business, the government can not wait until
trial to produce grounds for the forfeiture); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 681
(D. Md. 1976) (description of property sought by the government vague, and ownership of
the property refuted by defendants), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 591
F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afl'd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980).
I"' The first part of the government's burden will be met by an affirmative finding at
the preliminary hearing or by the grand jury indictment. Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 142-43 (1979) (there must be a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial
detention); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) (indictment provides sufficient
probable cause to justify detention of a defendant).
12 Pursuant to the statutes, the property subject to restraint must be derived either
from a "pattern of racketeering activity" under RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976), or
from participation in a "continuing criminal enterprise" under CCE, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)
(1976). Each item of property sought to be forfeited must be alleged in the indictment. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). The purpose of this provision is merely to give the defendant
notice of what property is sought. See id. advisory committee note on 1972 amendment;
Weiner, supra note 44, at 247-48. It is submitted, however, that notice alone, absent an
opportunity to respond and challenge the allegation, is inadequate. Cf. Friendly, supra note
97, at 1281 (opportunity to present reasons is "fundamental"); see supra note 81 and accom-
panying text (notice and opportunity to be heard).
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tation of evidence sufficient to justify pretrial restraint of an in-
dicted individual's property because of its alleged connection with
a crime. The suggested standard of proof for the postseizure hear-
ing is probable cause, which comports with the nature of the crimi-
nal pretrial proceeding.128 While several courts have proposed ap-
propriate standards of evidence for the pretrial hearing, there is no
clear consensus. For instance, in United States v. Veon, 127 a Cali-
fornia district court determined that the government must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it is "likely to convince a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. . . that the defendant is guilty of
violating [the Act] ...and . . . that the profits or properties at
issue are subject to forfeiture .... 1"28 Adopting the view of the
Third Circuit espoused in United States v. Long, 29 the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Crozier 30 and Spilotro1'3 concluded that the government
must show that "it is likely to convince a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt" of the existence of the same two elements set forth in
Veon. 1
32
126 United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 239 (E.D. Cal. 1982); see T. GARDNER,
supra note 119, at 123. Gardner sets forth the situations in which the probable cause stan-
dard of evidence is employed. Probable cause is necessary: 1) at a preliminary hearing to
hold the defendant over for trial; 2) to make an arrest; 3) to obtain a search warrant or an
arrest warrant; and 4) to make a probable cause search. T. GARDNER, supra note 119, at 123.
In all instances, the probable cause standard is employed in a criminal "non-trial type"
proceeding.
127 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
I28 Id. at 246-48 (quoting United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981)). The
Veon court addressed the question of what standard of proof was appropriate by means of
the balancing test set down by the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
754-55 (1982); 538 F. Supp. at 247-48. Santosky recognized that there were three levels of
proof applicable in a trial-type proceeding. a preponderance of the evidence, clear and con-
vincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 455 U.S. at 755-56. It is submitted,
however, that Santosky may be distinguished from RICO and CCE deprivation on the
ground that the hearing accorded in the RICO and CCE contexts is a pretrial proceeding.
The standard of proof in a pretrial adjudication need not and should not be a standard
equivalent to that used at trial. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12, 120-21 (1975) (in
criminal pretrial proceedings the probable cause standard avoids formality of a "full-blown"
trial, yet affords sufficient procedural safeguards). Additionally, the pretrial proceeding in
the in personam forfeiture action is criminal in nature and the burden of proof should be
the one applicable in criminal pretrial cases. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
12- 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
120 674 F.2d at 1298.
131 680 F.2d at 618.
132 Id.; 674 F.2d at 1298. The Ninth Circuit further propounded that the guidelines for
issuance of a civil preliminary injunction may be applied in the context of a criminal RICO
or CCE pretrial hearing. Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617; Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1297. This test
proposes four elements that the prosecution must meet in order to obtain a restraining or-
der: 1) a likelihood of prevailing on the merits; 2) irreparable harm will result in the absence
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It is submitted that a probable cause standard is more appro-
priate for the postseizure hearing for several reasons. First, in per-
sonam forfeiture is a criminal sanction and restraint pending trial
is a criminal action."' s Probable cause is the standard of proof used
in criminal preliminary hearings,134 while the preponderance stan-
dard and the "likely to" standard are civil in nature.135 Addition-
ally, restraint of a criminal defendant's property is strongly analo-
gous to the restraint of a defendant's liberty and to the seizure of
property pursuant to a search. The probable cause standard has
been deemed sufficient to restrain a defendant pending trial, s13 to
confiscate property which is the fruit of a crime, and to seize con-
traband.13 7 Certainly, if probable cause is sufficient in these in-
stances, it is a constitutionally appropriate predicate to justify the
restraint of an individual's property. Finally, use of the probable
cause standard is less burdensome than the more stringent prepon-
derance standard. A stricter standard could likely lead to extended
hearings, with the parties introducing more evidence, calling more
witnesses, and essentially trying the case on the merits in an effort
to meet or overcome their burden of proof. It is submitted that the
of relief; 3) the issuance will not substantially harm other parties; and 4) the public interest
supports the issuance. United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 682. It is submitted that
requiring the prosecution to prove that "it is likely to convince the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt" is a vague standard of proof. Cf. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 246-47 n.13 (stating that the
standard set down in Mandel is the degree of persuasion and not a standard of proof).
Additionally, it is suggested that the four-part preliminary injunction test does not provide
a sufficient method of determining whether a restraining order should enter in a RICO or
CCE hearing. The first inquiry has been criticized as a pretrial determination of guilt anni-
hilating the defendant's right to a fair trial. 408 F. Supp. at 683. Secondly, proof of irrepara-
ble harm can easily be shown by evidence of a possible preconviction transfer or disposition
of property. See id. Thirdly, the public interest inquiry will automatically be met as the
proceeding is criminal and the public interest in removing legitimate business concerns from
the reach of organized crime is a strong one. Id.
"I See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
134 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Probable cause exists if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
prudent man in believing that a suspect has committed or was committing an offense.
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76. See generally T. DOWLING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TEACHING
MATERIALS 132-38 (1976).
'16 See United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 244 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("employing
in rem procedure in a criminal action would raise substantial constitutional issues").
116 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
137 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure certain
property can be seized when there is probable cause to believe grounds for such seizure
exist. See id. Property which may be seized upon probable cause includes contraband, or
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime. See id. 41(b); see also 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 112, §§
661-662, at 578-89.
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probable cause standard provides adequate procedural protection
for the defendant without placing an unnecessary burden on an
already overburdened judiciary.
ASSESSING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE SUGGESTED PROCEEDING: THE
Eldridge TEST
Before the proposed postseizure hearing can be embraced as
an answer to the questions raised by RICO and CCE, it is neces-
sary to examine the extent to which it satisfies due process require-
ments. The Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,135 concluded
that in testing the sufficiency of the process to be used in connec-
tion with the seizure of property, the interest of the government
must be weighed against the interest of the private party.13 9 Spe-
cifically, the following factors must be considered: 1) the private
interest that will be affected by the government's action; 2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used in light
of the potential value of additional safeguards; and 3) the govern-
ment interest affected in consideration of the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that alternate hearings would necessarily entail.140
Clearly, the private interest affected by RICO and CCE prose-
cutions must be accorded substantial weight in light of the poten-
tial length of deprivation and the value of the economic interest at
stake.14 1 As to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation,
it is submitted that restraint of property upon the sole basis of a
grand jury indictment presents more than ample ground for er-
138 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"9 Id. at 334. Due process requires procedures to comport with the protections de-
manded by the particular situation. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)). Therefore, resolution of what procedures are necessary requires an inquiry into both
the government and the private interest. 424 U.S. at 334.
140 424 U.S. at 335. The Eldridge Court addressed the sufficiency of the prescribed
agency review in connection with the termination of Social Security disability payments. Id.
at 324-25. Upon receipt of notice that payments would be discontinued, the individual was
entitled to a nonadversarial board review. Id. at 339. The Court assessed the sufficiency of
this review through the use of three factors. First, the Court determined the weight of the
private interest at stake in light of two important considerations: the degree of potential
deprivation and the possible length of deprivation. Id. at 341-42. Second, to assess the risk
of erroneous deprivation, the Court considered the hardship the family would suffer due to
loss of monetary resources, id. at 342, as well as the fairness and reliability of the proceed-
ing, id. at 343, and possible alternative proceedings, id. at 344-47. The third factor weighed
in Eldridge was the public interest in view of the administrative and financial burden alter-
nate hearings would impose. Id. at 347-49. The Supreme Court concluded that the existing
administrative proceeding was sufficient to assure fair consideration of a claim. Id. at 349.
141 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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ror. 142 Alternatively, a hearing before a neutral and detached mag-
istrate, providing the defendant with such safeguards as the right
to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
the right to present evidence in his own behalf, would vitiate the
risk of erroneous deprivation. 43 Further, when similar private in-
terests have been at stake, as in the case of property seizure pursu-
ant to in rem forfeiture, a hearing has been held to be constitution-
ally mandated.1 44 Therefore, it is argued that the private interest is
"2 Indeed, while a criminal defendant may be restrained solely on the basis of a grand
jury indictment, there are numerous procedural safeguards which protect his rights prior to
the trial. "[Tihe Supreme Court's rulings on the inadmissibility of illegally-seized evidence,
improperly-obtained confessions, faulty eyewitness identifications, and other evidentiary
matters have been responsible for the increasing frequency of pretrial hearings at which
those issues can be explored." J. GORA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 83 (1978). Hearings are availa-
ble to the defendant to contest the validity of an identification made of him, United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967), to determine the voluntariness of a confession, Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378-79(1964), to determine if prior convictions may be used against a
defendant, United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1971) and to determine if
illegally obtained evidence can be used against him, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f). The defen-
dant's right to these hearings provides him with additional safeguards which prevent the
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and assure the continued presumption of his inno-
cence. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943). It is submitted that the
deprivation of an individual's property likewise entitles him to the due process protection of
a hearing to avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation.
145 See Friendly, supra note 97, at 1279-95. Judge Friendly lists the elements, in order
of priority, that may be afforded at a hearing: an unbiased tribunal, notice, an opportunity
to defend, the right to call witnesses, the right to hear evidence against him, and to have the
decision based only upon the evidence presented, the right to counsel, the right to a record
of the proceedings, and a statement of the reasons, public attendance, and the right to judi-
cial review. See id. The greater the deprivation, the greater the number of procedural safe-
guards necessary. Id. at 1278.
144 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677 (1974). In
Calero, the Supreme Court addressed the necessity for a hearing in connection with in rem
forfeiture of property. The Court recognized that a hearing was necessary to protect the
property owner's due process rights though it may be postponed until after seizure. Id. The
Court noted that the forfeiture provisions of the statute in question closely resembled CCE,
except for "unimportant differences." Id. at 686-87 n.25. It is submitted, therefore, that the
due process requirements of the postseizure hearing mandated after an in rem seizure are
similarly applicable to the in personam forfeiture. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17,
19 (1978) ("something less than a full evidentiary hearing" must be accorded promptly after
suspension of a driver's license); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975) (a hearing should
precede temporary suspension from school); North Ga. Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 606 (1970) (garnishment of a corporate bank account mandates prior hearing);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (deprivation of welfare benefits mandates the
procedural due process protections of a full hearing before termination); Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (garnishment of wages is "so obvious" a taking of prop-
erty as to mandate notice and a prior hearing); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551,
559 (1956) (before a professor can be discharged from public employment he must be af-
forded a hearing consistent with the mandates of due process).
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substantial, and provision for a hearing could greatly reduce the
risk of erroneous deprivation.
The third consideration requires an assessment of the fiscal
and administrative burden a hearing would entail. The proposed
adversarial hearing would be conducted before a neutral and de-
tached magistrate.145 Such a proceeding is employed in other ad-
ministrative actions,'146 and, as has been noted, is analagous to the
probable cause hearing afforded a pretrial detainee., 47 It is submit-
ted that this type of hearing, when used in other contexts, has not
proved to be an unjustifiable drain upon fiscal and administrative
resources. Further, in light of the argument that the hearing is con-
stitutionally implied to protect the defendant's due process rights,
the fact that the hearing might result in a greater administrative
and financial burden becomes irrelevant. 48 It is submitted that
any additional burden imposed by a hearing does not and cannot
override the need for its protections mandated by consideration of
the dictates of the due process clause.
CONCLUSION
By providing for the unprecedented penalty of in personam
forfeiture, RICO and CCE are unique statutes in American juris-
prudence. While frequently the subject of constitutional attack
and opposing judicial interpretation, these two statutes have sur-
vived scrutiny. It is submitted that to preserve their constitutional-
ity, RICO and CCE must be read to provide the criminal defen-
41 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 611-13 (1979) (inquiry by a neutral factfinder
into the necessity for institutionalizing a child); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970)
(full evidentiary hearing required prior to deprivation of welfare benefits).
147 FED. R. CmRh. P. 5.1(a) The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[a]n
officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an
arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the
nearest available federal magistrate .... Id. The purpose of the hearing is to determine if
sufficient probable cause exists to detain the defendant. See id. The defendant is entitled to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to introduce evidence in his own behalf. See id. Deten-
tion of an individual can deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution. The probable
cause hearing accorded a pretrial detainee is a procedural safeguard which aids in ensuring
that the defendant will not erroneously be deprived of his liberty. J. GORA, supra note 142,
at 28.
148 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261
(1970). The Goldberg Court, noted that "[w]hile the problem of additional expense must be
kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due
process." 397 U.S. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 887, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))
(footnotes omitted).
1983]
804 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:776
dant with the protections of an adequate hearing immediately
after the government restrains property alleged to be subject to
forfeiture. Such a requirement minimizes the potential for error
and abuse inherent in the broad grant of enforcement power em-
bodied in both statutes.
Jean A. Hegler
